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4- CHAPTER 24 4
Pitfalls on the Road to a 
Positive Psychology of Hope
Barry Schwartz
T
he phenomenon of learned helplessness may well be the most 
significant and most pervasively influential psychological dis­
covery in the last thirty-five years. Learned helplessness is 
extremely important in its own right, but in addition, its impact has 
extended across a wide variety of different domains of psychological 
research. It has contributed to changing the way people think about 
basic learning processes. It has influenced the way people think about 
motivation. It has affected the way people think about child develop­
ment. It has altered the way people think about education. It has affected 
the way people think about the relation between mind, brain, and 
behavior. It has influenced the way people think about personality. It has 
had a major impact on the way people think about attribution processes, 
the turf of social psychology. It has influenced the way people think 
about work. It has affected the way people think about aging. And of 
course, it has transformed the way people think about the causes and 
treatments of psychopathology, most especially, of depression.
And now it may have its biggest influence yet. For much of its his­
tory, psychology has been concerned with identifying human weakness 
and correcting or ameliorating it. Now, learned helplessness, in the guise 
of its complement, “learned optimism,” may help to shape a positive 
psychology—a psychology that perhaps will someday illuminate what 
a human life at its best can be and show us how we can help people 
make their lives good lives.
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Taken together, the contributions to the present volume provide an 
impressive blueprint for the beginnings of a positive psychology—a 
psychology of hope. As each of the specific research areas sketched in 
this volume continues to develop, psychology will be able to tell us 
more and more about how to nurture strong and resilient people. And 
yet, the contributions to this volume also provide hints about difficult 
questions that will have to be faced and addressed if a positive psychol­
ogy is to evolve. I think it is important for people to be thinking about 
these questions while the psychology of hope is stiU in its infancy. Thus, 
in this general commentary on the prospects for a future psychology 
of hope,” I will enumerate the issues I think aU contributors to that psy­
chology should be addressing.
THE “depression EPIDEMIC”: IS PSYCHOLOGY PART 
OF THE SOLUTION OR PART OF THE PROBLEM?
Learned helplessness has taught us about the importance of control and 
autonomy to mental health. In particular, helplessness has taught us that 
a lack of control, coupled with a certain characteristic style of causal 
explanation, creates candidates for clinical depression. Given that hav­
ing control over important things in one’s life is important to prevent­
ing clinical depression, we can ask ourselves what we might expect the 
incidence of depression to be like in modern American society.
Most of us now live in a world in which we experience control to a 
degree that people living in other times and places would think quite 
unimaginable. Extraordinary material wealth enables us to consume an 
astonishing quantity and variety of goods. And the magical mechanism 
of the market allows us an almost hmitless array of choices: milk with 
or without lactose and with whatever percentage of fat one wants; jeans 
of every conceivable cut; restaurants serving foods from all over the 
world; cars of almost an infinite variety of shapes, sizes, colors, and 
prices. On and on it goes; if you want something, no matter how odd 
it is, chances are there is someone, somewhere, ready to sell it to you.
With regard to higher education, curricular requirements have almost 
vanished, and to the extent they still exist, they can be satisfied in so
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many different ways that they might as well not be there.
With regard to entertainment and culture, the range of what is avail­
able is staggering. Cultural invention has enormously expanded the 
variety of options, and advances in media technology have made most 
of these options accessible, in one way or another, to almost everybody.
With regard to careers, there is an enormous degree of mobility, both 
in career-type and m geographical location. People are not constrained 
to do the work their parents did, in the place in which their parents did 
it. Nor are people constrained to have only a single occupation for their 
entire working lives. And for the most part, success and advancement m 
work are based on talent and achievement. So almost anything is pos­
sible.
With regard to personal life, religious, ethnic, racial, class, geographic, 
and even gender barriers to mate selection are rapidly disappearing. 
Moreover, one is free to choose whether to have children or not, 
whether to have them early or late, whether to bear them or adopt 
them, whether to have them as part of a traditional marriage and fam­
ily or as part of any of a host of non-traditional family arrangements. 
And it is remarkably easy to get out of marriages that have turned sour, 
and having done that, to arrange child custody in ways that suit the 
involved parties.
In sum, I think it is only a slight exaggeration to say that for the first 
time in human history, large numbers of people can live exactly the 
kind of lives they want, unconstrained by material, economic, or cultural 
limitations. Based on this fact, coupled with the helplessness theory of 
depression, one might expect clinical depression in the United States to 
be going the way of poho.With so many opportunities for control avail­
able, why would anyone become depressed?
Instead, what we find is an explosive growth of depression (e.g., Kler- 
man, et al., 1985; Robins, et al., 1984)- Some estimates are that depres­
sion is ten times as likely to afflict someone now than at the turn of the 
century. This result demands explanation and two explanations come 
readily to mind. The first is that the helplessness theory of depression is 
wrong; that there is no relation between control and depression. The 
second is that despite appearances to the contrary, people don’t really 
have more control over their lives than they once did.
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I think both of these explanations are mistaken. I’m quite convinced 
by the literature that there is a strong relation between lack of control 
and depression. And I find it hard to imagine the possibility that peo­
ple had more control in pre-technological, culturally rigid times than 
they do now. So in my view, we have a puzzle. It is this puzzle that led 
to the question at the heading of this section: Is psychology part of the 
solution or is it part of the problem?
The correct answer to this question, I beheve, is yes.That psychology 
is part of the solution is obvious; our understanding of depression allows 
us to help alleviate human misery far more effectively than ever before. 
Thus, I will dwell on the respects in which psychology is part of the 
problem. Here, I think three distinct forces are at work;
1. Increases in experienced control over the years have been accompanied, 
stride-for-stride, by increases in expectations about control. The more we are 
allowed to be the masters of our fates in one domain of life after 
another, the more we expect to be. Education is expected to be stimu­
lating and useful. Work is supposed to be exciting, socially valuable, and 
remunerative. Spouses are supposed to be sexually, emotionally, and 
intellectually stimulating and also loyal and comforting. Friends are sup­
posed to be fun to be with and devoted. Children are supposed to be 
beautiful, smart, affectionate, obedient, and independent. And every­
thing we buy is supposed to be the best of its kind; with all the choice 
available, people should never have to settle for things that are just “good 
enough.” In short, life is supposed to be perfect. Psychology has, I 
believe, contributed to these unrealistic expectations via its cultivation 
of a kind of cult of psychotherapy intended not to relieve suffering but 
to engender “self-actuahzation”—satisfaction in all things. And a future 
“positive psychology” may subvert itself by feeding into these expecta­
tions.
2. American culture has become more individualistic than it ever was before. 
What this means, I think, is that not only do people expect perfection 
in all things, but they expect to produce this perfection themselves. 
When they (inevitably) fail, I believe that the culture of individualism 
biases them toward making causal attributions that focus on internal 
rather than external causal factors.That is, I believe that the culture has 
established a kind of officially acceptable style of causal explanation, and
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it is one that focuses on the individual. As Sehgman’s research has led the 
way in demonstrating (e.g., Peterson & Seligman, 1984), this kind of 
causal attribution is just the kind to promote depression when people 
are faced with failure. And if my first point is correct, despite their 
increased control, people will be faced inevitably with many occasions 
that, by their own lights, count as failure. Psychology has contributed 
significantly to this excessive focus on the individual with its emphasis 
on personal growth and autonomy, and on looking out for number 
one.3. Finally, the emphasis on the individual to which psychology has con­
tributed may well be undermining what may be a crucial vaccine against depres­
sion: deep commitment and belonging to social groups and institutions -families, 
civic institutions, and faith communities, as several contributors to this vol­
ume (e.g., Fincham, Garber, Myers, Miller, Nolen-Hoeksema) have sug­
gested. There is an inherent tension between doing one’s own thing, or 
being one’s own person, and meaningful involvement in social groups. 
Doing the latter right requires submerging “one’s own thing.” So the 
more people focus on themselves—with respect both to goals and to the 
means of achieving those goals—the more their connections to others 
will be weakened. Political scientist Robert Putnam has recently 
attracted a great deal of attention to this deterioration of social con­
nection in modern America (e.g., 1993, I995, 1996)-And in this con­
nection it is relevant to note a study by Egeland and Hostetter (1983)) 
which showed an incidence of depression among the Amish of Lan­
caster County, Pennsylvania, that was about half the national rate while 
other forms of psychopathology were much closer to national averages. 
The Amish, of course, are an extremely cohesive, tightly knit, traditional 
community.
It goes without saying that psychology is not solely, or even princi­
pally, responsible for these trends. It is clearly reasonable for people to 
place increasing reliance on themselves as the various social and public 
institutions they once could count on for support (for a social as well 
as an economic “safety net”) stop serving that function. And we all 
know for the last twenty years or so it has been official government 
policy, at all levels, to allow that safety net to fray. Nevertheless, psy­
chology has done plenty to exacerbate these trends and nothing to ame-
404 SCHWARTZ
liorate them. A future psychology of hope must grapple with these 
issues. An effort to cultivate optimism of the wrong kind—optimism 
that does not take the three points I just raised into account, may well 
make the problem worse rather than better.
COGNITION AND HOPE: HAPPIER OR WISER?
Much of the focus in the helplessness theory of depression is on cog­
nition. From this perspective, depression largely is a cognitive disorder. 
People think about success and failure, and about their role in it, in a way 
that is harmful. If we can change the way people explain their successes 
and failures to themselves, we can break up or (as Chapter ii, the Shatte, 
Gillham, & Reivich contribution to this volume, suggests) prevent 
depression. And to shift the emphasis from negative to positive, if depres­
sion represents the wrong way to think about success and failure, then 
getting people to think about success and failure in the right way should 
engender optimism and hope.
Armed with the view that depression results from disordered cogni­
tion, people who want to treat or prevent it would develop techniques 
designed to order cognition. But what do the words “disordered” and 
“ordered” mean? At first blush, one would assume that “disordered” 
means distorted—that the task faced by chnicians and educators is to get 
people to see the world accurately.
Alas, this assumption is wrong; things are not this way. In 1979, Alloy 
and Abramson pubHshed a landmark study that showed that under some 
significant circumstances, depressed people judge their abiUty to control 
the world more accurately than do non-depressed people. This phe­
nomenon has come to be known as “depressive realism,” or as “opti­
mistic bias.” I had always been troubled by this finding, not because I 
doubted its vahdity but because it raised for me a very serious ethical 
dilemma: Should we be aspiring to develop techniques that get people 
to see things as they are, or should we be aspiring to get people to see 
things in a way that is good for them? Are we after truth or happiness 
in the people with whom we work?
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In a context in which this ethical dilemma arises in connection with 
treating depression—with efforts to alleviate significant pain and suf­
fering—it seems to me to be only a minor nag in the back of one s 
mind. People come to therapy in real misery, and by teaching them 
habits of optimistic (if inaccurate) thinking, one can alleviate that mis­
ery. Therapeutic drugs have side effects, but we learn to live with them 
because the therapeutic effects far outweigh the side effects. So too, 
perhaps, with non-drug therapies. We should be able to live with opti­
mistic bias as a side effect of cognitive treatments of depression because 
their therapeutic effects are so beneficial.
Unfortunately, this minor nag grows much larger when we shift the 
context from negative to positive—from alleviating suffering in the 
depressed to inculcating optimism and hope in everyone. Now it seems 
we are talking about putting these “drugs, with their side effects into 
the water supply. Now, the temptation will be all around us even in 
dealing with perfectly healthy people to induce them to color or dis­
tort their cognitions just a little bit because such distortion is “good” for 
them.
We see in the Shatte, Gillham, and Reivich discussion of the Penn 
Optimism Project (POP) that what we might caU the “advance guard” 
of a positive psychology is concerned with engendering accuracy rather 
than foolish optimism in rmddle-school children. But if it should turn 
out that illusions of control or optimistic bias work just as well, or even 
better, than accuracy, how long will it be before the insistence on main­
taining the accuracy of cognition slides away because there is a very 
effective distortion that protects kids against depression?
And the opportunities to nurture such distortions are legion. Here are 
a few examples:
1. Carol Dweck (see Dweck & Leggett, 1988) has shown that children 
can be divided into those with a helpless orientation and those with a 
mastery orientation, that these orientations in turn stem from entity 
(inteUigence is a fixed entity that can not be increased through one’s 
individual efforts) or “incremental” (people can get smarter) theories of 
intelligence, and that children with a mastery orientation (and an incre­
mental theory of intelligence) do better when faced with school chal­
lenges than those with a helpless orientation. Suppose that as empirical
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research proceeds on the vexed question of the nature of intelligence it 
turns out that intelligence actually is a fixed entity (this is the claim of 
Herrnstein & Murray, 1994, and while I do not believe it is correct [see 
Schwartz, 1997], it certainly could be). What role are we supposed to 
play in creating a positive psychology of hope when the facts as we 
know them are not positive?
2. Related to the work reported by Satterfield in this volume, Zul- 
low and Seligman (1990; see also ZuUow, Oettingen, Peterson, & SeHg- 
man, 1988) have shown that politicians whose speeches tend to be 
optimistic are more likely to win elections than politicians whose 
speeches are pessimistic. When I first read this work, it sent chiUs down 
my spine. It made me think of a quote from a very popular disc jockey 
who said, when asked to explain his popularity, “The secret of success 
in this business is sincerity; if you can fake that, you’ve got it made.” To 
say that we currently have a credibiHty problem with political leaders is 
an understatement. But if it were widely known that the way to impress 
the electorate is to sound optimistic, then we could count on the cred­
ibility problem getting a good deal worse, as poHticians, no matter what 
they actually thought, gave speeches that were full of optimism.
3. Suppose it were to turn out that women who accepted some 
responsibility for being sexually assaulted (“I flirted,” or “I was out walk­
ing alone late at night”) showed a better prognosis for recovery from the 
psychological consequences of the assault than women who did not 
accept responsibility, a perfectly plausible possibility since to accept 
responsibility is to acknowledge a degree of personal control that might 
prevent a similar assault in the future. Does a practitioner of the “psy­
chology of hope” attempt to get such assault victims to assume respon­
sibility whatever the truth of the matter might be?
4. Suppose that, as some of the contributions to this volume indicate 
(Nolen-Hoeksema, Myers, MiUer), religious faith and commitment 
reduce dramatically the risk of depression. Does a practitioner of the 
positive psychology of hope encourage people to embrace a faith for 
instrumental, rather than metaphysical and spiritual reasons? What does 
such an “instrumental” view of faith do to faith in the long run?
5. Suppose it were to turn out, as I deeply suspect, that the only real 
predictor of the behavior of financial markets is people’s expectations
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about those markets, that such economic variables as inflation rates, 
interest rates, unemployment rates, trade balances, and the hke all pale 
in importance -when compared to people’s optimism or pessimism about 
the economic future. As a psychology of hope develops, what role is psy­
chology to play as it watches members of the financial community use 
that psychology to drive up market values and drum up commissions— 
until the bubble bursts? A dose of “realism” in this context might harm 
people both psychologically and financially.
Each of these examples points out a possible tension between truth 
and happiness that a future positive psychology will face. I don’t want 
to be taken here to suggest that people working in this area are not 
mindful of this dilemma. What 1 do want to suggest is that while the 
dilemma is not especially significant when one is working to alleviate 
suffering, it will loom very large indeed when the focus shifts from 
repairing the negative to nurturing the positive. It would be good for 
the field to think this dilemma through before it grows in significance.
CHANGING COGNITION OR CHANGING THE WORLD
Another thing that is troubling to me about the helplessness/optimism- 
derived focus on changing cognition to promote a positive psychology 
is that it can foster a tendency to ignore or minimize attention to what 
people are actually experiencing in the world. It suggests that we can fix 
the world by fixing the way people think about it. What is troubling to 
me about this is that often people are miserable for very good reasons. 
And if we were able actually to develop a positive psychology of hope, 
then perhaps we would know how to make people happy without very 
good reasons. I would rather see us finding a way to make people 
happy for good reasons, but that would suggest an emphasis on things 
other than developing the most effective way to engender optimistic 
cognitive styles in people. That would suggest an emphasis on finding 
ways to change the world rather than changing the way people think 
about it. Since it is almost certainly easier to change the way people 
think about the world than it is to change the world, my concern here 
is that over time, a successful positive psychology wiU develop techniques
4o8 SCHWARTZ
that induce people to tolerate intolerable living conditions.
The contributions to this volume that struck me as especially relevant 
in this connection are Csikszentmihalyi s discussion of“flow” as it relates 
to human activities, and Fincham’s discussion of marriage and the fam­
ily. These papers address the two central features of human hfe—work 
and love. I certainly aspire to a world in which the majority of people 
can experience “flow”—a kind of timelessness that comes from intrin­
sic satisfaction—in their work lives. I think that there are two distinct 
ways in which this might be achieved. The first, and harder, way is to 
restructure the nature of work so that most people’s jobs contain the 
characteristics that Csikszentmihalyi has identified as critical to flow. 
Deadeningly repetitive, unchaUenging, and oversupervised jobs are not 
the sort of things to produce flow. The second, easier way is to change 
the way people think about their work, without changing the nature of 
the work itself I fear that a successful positive psychology of hope will 
give us the tools to make people satisfied with work Hves that should not 
satisfy them.
In connection with the family, and with marriage in particular, I have 
a similar kind of concern. Sociologist Arlie Hochschild has written an 
important book on the modern, two-career couple. The Second Shift 
(1989). The book includes a series of detailed case studies of harried, 
overworked, two-career couples. A significant source of tension in these 
marriages is what Hochschild calls “the economy of gratitude.” The 
problem of the economy of gratitude is not the sharing of household 
responsibilities between wife and husband, but rather each one’s inter­
pretation of what he or she is doing. So, for example, the husband takes 
out the garbage four times a week instead of two, and thinks that for this 
he deserves some sort of distinguished service medal, and wonders why 
his wife isn’t full of praise, affection, and gratitude for his sacrifices. 
Meanwhile, the wife is wondering why all her husband can see his way 
clear to do is take out the garbage, as if all household chores are her 
responsibility and whatever he does is a favor. So each partner is con­
tributing to the household, and each partner thinks he or she is doing 
a lot, while the other thinks he or she is not doing nearly enough. The 
conflict, Hochschild argues, has more to do with mismatched percep­
tions or interpretations of actions than with the actions themselves.
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This kind of marital conflict would seem to be just the sort of thing 
for which modification of cognition is made to order. But Hochschild 
also observes that “each marriage bears the footprints of economic and 
cultural trends which originate far outside marriage” (p. ii). Among 
the economic trends she has in mind are the decrease in real wages that 
has made it almost impossible for a single fuU-time wage to support a 
family, coupled with an attendant rise in the need for child-care serv­
ices and flexible work schedules without nearly enough initiative, in 
either the pubHc or the private sector, to meet this need. So by using a 
positive psychology to change the way people think about their mar­
riages, we may paper over the need to change the actual detailed work­
ings of these marriages.
My concern about changing cognitions rather than changing the 
world can be summarized as follows; when the world needs changing, 
we should change the world and not how people think about it.
LIBERAL INDIVIDUALISM AS THE MAIN OBSTACLE 
TO A POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY
I want to conclude this commentary by indicating what I think may be 
the main obstacle ahead to developing a positive psychology of hope. 
In the short run, a positive psychology that follows the trail blazed by 
“learned optimism” can make a real contribution to human welfare. 
Teaching people adaptive ways to think about their efficacy in the world 
will almost certainly reduce the incidence of debilitating depression. 
Teaching people that they do control their destinies in important 
respects will almost certainly increase the energy with which they face 
life’s challenges, and that in turn will almost certainly increase the 
chances that they can get the world to do for them what they want it 
to do. And this would be no small achievement.
The problem, I think, is that a richly developed positive psychology 
has to do more than teach people how to do things—it has to do more 
than teach people effective techniques for getting what they want out 
of life. It must also teU them something about what they should be try­
ing to get. That is, it must be informed by a vision of what a good
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human life contains.Thus a positive psychology wiU have to be willing 
to tell people that, say, a good, meaningful, productive human life 
includes commitment to education, commitment to family and to other 
social groups, commitment to excellence in one’s activities, commit­
ment to virtues such as honesty, loyalty, courage, and justice in one’s 
dealings with others, and so on.
The official “ideology” of modern America poses an enormous bar­
rier to this kind of contentful positive psychology. The ideology of 
America is the ideology of liberahsm—^let people decide for themselves 
what is good. Modern liberal culture is extremely reluctant to tell peo­
ple what to do. And social science has internalized that credo: don’t be 
“judgmental”; help people get what they want, but don’t teU them what 
they should be wanting. Some modern social theorists, like philosopher 
Alasdair MacIntyre (1981), have even argued that the nonjudgmental 
character of the culture has become so pervasive that we no longer have 
the cultural resources with which to speak intelligibly about “the good 
life,” even if we want to. MacIntyre argues that the language of “virtue” 
must be supported by social practices that embody that language in 
order for virtue terms really to mean anything, and that modern soci­
ety lacks those practices. The result is that even when people are will­
ing to talk about virtues and “the good Ufe,” they spend most of their 
time talking past one another.
It is one thing to encounter people in extreme psychological pain and 
to tell them, gently, how to change the content of their lives so as to 
reheve that pain. Few people wiU object to psychologists who “impose” 
their values in this way to relieve suffering. But a positive psychology is 
a whole other story. A positive psychology will be indiscriminate in 
imposing its values; it will be putting its values in the community water 
supply, like fluoride. Is psychology prepared to be a science that pro­
motes certain values instead of one that encourages “self-actualization”? 
And if it is, wiU modern, liberal society stand for it?
Notice how the very notion that psychology might articulate a vision 
of the good hfe contradicts the emphasis on freedom, autonomy, and 
choice that are so much a part of modern aspiration, and not coinciden­
tally, so much a part of learned optimism, as we currently understand it.
To summarize this final concern of mine about a future positive
psychology; Once, clinical psychologists had “patients.” Over the years, 
as the disciphne grew concerned that “patient” implied illness, which in 
turn imphed a conception of “health,” a conception of the goal of ther­
apy that the field did not really have, “patients” became “clients.” Doc­
tors have patients.The patients come in sick, and the doctors make them 
well. Restoring and maintaining physical health and alleviating suffer­
ing is the goal of medicine. Lawyers, in contrast, have clients. Lawyers 
don’t have goals for clients the way doctors have goals for patients. 
Rather, lawyers are there to help the cHent achieve his or her own goal. 
Clients define their goals in a way that patients do not. So in moving 
from “patients” to “clients,” psychology moved from having the practi­
tioner define the goal to having the recipient define the goal. What will 
we call the recipients of our services if and when a positive psychology 
comes to fruition? I don’t think that either “patients” or “clients” does 
justice to the grand vision that informs these beginnings of a positive 
psychology. The right term, I think, is “students.” Are we prepared to 
argue that it is future generations of psychologists of hope who should 
be society’s teachers? I think that unless we are prepared to say yes to 
this question, and to develop arguments about the content of a good 
human life, the potential achievements of a future positive psychology 
will always be limited. And I also believe that the time to be thinking 
and talking about this very big and difficult issue is now, at the begin­
ning, and not later, in the face of angry critics trying to put us in our 
place.
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